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PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM OF SALINITY
OF THE COLORADO RIVER*
DR. EDMUNDO HERNANDEZ VELA SALGADO**

Undoubtedly the main problem that has existed between our
country and the United States, and that which we are attempting to
resolve through Minute 242,' is the problem of the salinity of the
Colorado River. This river serves as the international border between
the two countries for a length of only 29 km. of a total 2,250 km.
from its source in the Rocky Mountains to its mouth in the Gulf of
California. Although such a short stretch of the river serves as the
border, the waters of the Colorado River, due to artificial conditions,
have been causing great problems for the governments of both
countries for over 12 years. These problems are greater than those of
the Rio Grande and the Tijuana River, even though the former flows
for 2000 km. between the two lands.
ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM 2
The United States Government, upon the demand of the farmers
of Wellton-Mohawk and the Arizona State Government in 1960
began expensive works in order to regenerate and rehabilitate the
unused lands in this district, which, for more than 40 years, had been
washed with salt water which originated in deep wells and which was
not related to the waters of the Colorado River. The waters of this
river were transported to the Wellton-Mohawk Valley in order to
leach the salt deposits. Later, this water was recombined with the
flow of the Colorado 3 at the mouth of the Gila River and delivered
to Mexico within the quota assigned by the Treaty of 1944.'
*Presented at Oaxtepec, Mexico, March 15, 1974. Translated from the Spanish by G.
Bahamon.
**Director, Center of International Relations, Faculty of Political and Social Science,
National Autonomous University of Mexico.
1. Reprinted in this issue at page 2.
2. For more comprehensive discussions, see Note, A History and Interpretation of the
Water Treaty of 1944, 12 Natural Resources J. 600 (1972); Vela, La diplomacia de la sal,
Boletin del Centro de Relaciones Internacionales, June 1972, at 1; Lopez Zamora, El conflicto internacional de la contaminacion de las aguas del Rio Colorado. Un andlisis de
cardcterpolitico, Politica, Dec. 10, 1974, at I.
3. Sobarzo, La salinidad de las aguas del Rio Colorado, 8 Pensamiento Politico 197
(1971).
4. Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande, February 3, 1944 (with protocol of November 14, 1944), 59
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This irrigation system was put into operation on February 10,
1961' and has grown through the addition of a large number of wells
drilled near the border to intercept water for use in Arizona which
normally supplies the subterranean currents of the Mexicali Valley.
By the end of 1961, the farmers of the Mexicali Valley began to
observe that the saline concentration of the river was increasing considerably, causing serious damage to their land and crops.
The agriculture of the Mexicali Valley at that time was known for
its high production, superior to the rest of Mexico, although at a
relatively high cost. The main projects were cotton and wheat. Cotton harvests had tripled in less than two decades, and three tons of
wheat per hectare were being produced.
The major interests of the people of the Mexicali Valley, especially
of the rural population, have been cruelly affected by this action
which has lasted 12 years, causing great economic losses, raising production costs, and increasing expenditures for research concerning
the possibilities of developing crops resistant to salinity. This same
action has had considerable and permanent repercussions in regional
sources of labor and in agriculture as well as in commerce, industry,
and even in public services. These repercussions are permanent because the salinity of the land will not disappear by simply restraining
the use of salt water in the future.
The analyses, previously carried out both in the United States and
in Mexico, show that the median concentration of salts in the river
waters fluctuated between 700 and 928 parts per million (ppm).6
However, in December 1961, the concentration suddenly went beyond 3000 ppm and continued above 2000 ppm until the end of
1965,' when, through application of Minute 218,8 signed in March
of the same year, the salinity was reduced to 1300 ppm.9 Later, the
concentration was reduced to 1140 ppm by the end of 1972 and to
less than 1010 ppm in these first months of 1974, through application of Minutes 24110 and 242, ' respectively.
Stat. 1219 (1945), T.S. No. 994 (Tratado con los Estados Unidos de America para la
Distribuci6n de Aguas Internacionales de los Rios Bravo, Colorado y Tijuana, 3 de febrero
de 1944, Diario Oficial, 30 de enero de 1946).
5. Lopez Zamora, supra note 2, at XIV-XV.
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, General
Background on the Mineral Pollution Problem in the Colorado River Basin 5 (1968).
7. Sobarzo, supra note 3, at 197.
8. 4 Int'l Legal Materials 545 (1965), 55 Dep't of State Bull. 555 (1965); Secretaria de
Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1964-65, at 545.
9. Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1968-69, at 114.
10. 67 Dep't State Bull. 198 (1972); Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1971-72, at
102.
11. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.

January 19751

ECONOMICASPECTS OF SALINITY

EFFECTS OF SALINITY
It is a well-known fact that when there is a major concentration of
salts in irrigation waters, crops benefit less from these waters; therefore, the demand for water increases and it is necessary to gradually
reduce the production area to maintain proportional yields.1 2
The degree of salinity tolerance of crops is variable, but there are
few species that can tolerate high concentrations of salts in the soil
without a readily perceptible change in yield. Some of these salttolerant species are sugar beets, barley, and, to a lesser extent,
cotton. However, studies carried out in the United States, such as the
report presented to the Department of the Interior by the Committee to Establish Criteria Concerning Water Quality, clearly state that
"water with 1000-2000 ppm may have adverse effects upon agriculture and at the same time require careful treatment." 1 3 Other
studies carried out specifically to determine the maximum salinity
that water used in agriculture should contain, show figures which
vary between 1400 and 500 ppm, according to research carried out
by Dr. Becket and the California State Government." 4
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The Kennedy administration financed and developed the WelltonMohawk projects which caused the excessive and artificial saline contamination of the Colorado River.
During the development of these projects, studies were initiated in
order to solve the problems, and Mexico received only an additional
280,000 acre-feet (1 acre-foot = 1233.5 m 3 ) of water from Lake
Mead in the winter of 1962, which improved the situation of the
Mexicali Valley farmers only slightly. The terms of Minute 218 became effective at the end of 1965. It provided that the waters that
were used to leach the saline deposits in the Wellton-Mohawk Valley
would be drained toward the riverhead, upstream from the Morelos
Dam, through a canal which crossed the above mentioned dam, so
that Mexico could discharge the saline water into the Gulf of California. This first step, along with other arrangements, reduced the
salinity of the river to 1300 ppm. Minute 241, signed on July 13,
1972, replaced Minute 218, and Mexico began to receive water with
a lower saline concentration which was brought from the Yuma Wells
12. Miramontes, La doctrina Harmon: El Tratado de Aguas de 1944 y algunosproblemas
derivados de su aplicaci6n, 6 Foro Internacional 49, 95 (1965).
13. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado River Water Quality
Improvement Program (1972).
14. Miramontes, supra note 12, at 95.
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instead of the Arizona wells; consequently the salinity was reduced
to 1140 ppm.
Finally, trying to arrive at a definitive solution to the problems of
the delivery of contaminated water to Mexico, Minute 242 was
signed on August 30, 1973. Pursuant to this Minute, water with a
saline concentration which exceeds the saline concentration of the
water at Imperial Dam by more than 150 ppm will not be delivered
to Mexico. The following plan was agreed to: The United States will
build, at its own expense, an extension of the canal that drains the
salt water from the Morelos Dam to the Santa Clara Marsh in the
Gulf of California. (This will not mean that the canal will be an
American right-of-way through Mexico.) The United States will also
promise to prevent these drainage waters from containing radioactive
materials or residues; however, the Minute does not refer specifically
to any other type of contaminant.
It should also be pointed out that the United States is committed
to "support efforts by Mexico to obtain appropriate financing on
favorable terms for the improvement and rehabilitation of the Mexicali Valley," ' I and to give "nonreimbursable" technical assistance' 6 for the same objectives.
FINAL REMARKS
Obviously, the artificial contamination of the waters of the Colorado, as an international river, has caused serious losses to the Mexican national economy. A definitive solution to this grave problem
should come about only after reestablishing the status quo, and after
the United States has paid compensation for the following items:
1. Lands which have become unusable.
2. Repercussions in agriculture which include losses ranging from
decreasing production per hectare to the total loss of crops.
3. Repercussions in public services, commerce, and industry in the
Mexicali Valley.
4. The amount of uncontaminated water that has not been received
or that has been wasted, based on the quota that is assigned to
Mexico by the Treaty of 1944.
5. Expenses for rehabilitating the Mexicali Valley which, under
other circumstances, our country could have avoided.
6. Expenditures for the rehabilitation of damaged lands.
7. The difference in the price of products which are now being
imported because they cannot be produced in the area.
15. Minute 242, para. 7. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
16. Id.
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However, Minute 242 only attempts to improve as far as possible
the technical aspect of the problem, since Mexico will continue to
receive water with a higher saline content than it had normally received up to 1960, and with a higher saline content than the water
received by American farmers. It is also possible that if the United
States Congress approves expenditures for a desalinization plant to
be built in Arizona at a cost of 62.6 million dollars and also for a
canal that would carry the saline waters to the Gulf of California,' I
a "drainage canal" built by the United States would run through our
land, possibly contaminating the Gulf of California with nonradioactive industrial wastes that are as damaging as radioactive residues.
Then the United States could also argue, as it did in relation to the
Treaty of 1944, that the new agreement does not have an express
stipulation in this regard.
Regarding the economic aspect, Mexico is abandoning its right to
claim the indemnification due for past damages and consequential
damages which will even have repercussions for the future, and seems
to be resigned to accepting the promise of loans and "nonpayable
assistance" made by the United States. Nevertheless, if the United
States Congress is hindering the approval of funds for the desalinization plant by mixing this project with the two others the Congress
will be even less interested in approving budgetary allocations for
"nonpayable assistance" which might signify a form of indemnification, if only partial.
Finally, sharing the waters of an international river as well as
fighting against contamination and its consequences should be
carried out according to a good neighbor policy. However, resolving a
country's internal problems without considering damages that might
be caused to other countries is not a good example of this policy,
since it is to abdicate international responsibility.

17. Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320,
88 Stat. 266 (1974), approving these expenditures, on June 24, 1974 [Ed.].

